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THE NEW RAPE SHIELD LAW AND THE CHARTER
R.J. Delisle*
When evidence of a complainant’s sexual history is admitted during a sexual 
assault trial, the evidence has the potential to prejudice the outcome of the trial. 
The trier of fact may give the evidence an exaggerated probative value when 
examining the issue of consent. Alternatively, the judge or jury might conclude, 
as the result of such evidence, that the complainant’s worth as a person is suspect, 
and accordingly they might not take their task of carefully analyzing the evidence 
as seriously as they should; they might not see a conviction as important as it 
might be with respect to another victim.1 On the other hand, a blanket exclusion 
of such evidence could cause an injustice. Parliament has tried, for the third 
time,2 to draw the appropriate line which will ensure a fair trial and at the same 
time protect the legitimate interests of both the complainant and the accused. 
This paper suggests that Parliament has fallen short of the mark once again, and 
that the evidentiary provisions enacted are unconstitutional.
The former s. 276 of the Criminal Code3 amounted to a blanket exclusion of 
evidence of sexual conduct of the complainant with persons other than the 
accused, subject to three exceptions: rebuttal evidence, evidence as to the identity 
of the assailant, and evidence of conduct on the same occasion as the charge 
relating to the accused’s honest belief in consent. In Seaboyer,4 the Supreme 
Court decided that s. 276 offended the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 
since the section forbade evidence which might, in a particular case, be essential 
to an accused’s defence. The legislation did not provide for any possible exercise 
of discretion by the trial judge to receive such evidence when the probative value 
of the evidence outweighed the potential prejudice to the proper outcome of the 
trial. The rigidity of the provision was found to be a violation of s. 7 of the 
Charter. The majority in Seaboyer noted an analogy with the situation when 
similar fact evidence is tendered by the Crown:
Of the Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. For an earlier version of the writer’s thoughts, see 
“Potential Charter Challenges to the New Rape Shield Law” (1992) 13 C.R. (4th) 390.
^ or  discussion of how disclosure of the victim’s sexual past can prejudice the outcome of the trial, 
and how myths and stereotypes get in the way of clear thought, see the dissenting opinion of Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé in R. v. Seaboyer (1991), 7 C.R. (4th) 117 at 171-84 [hereinafter Seaboyer].
2See the judicial review of the first attempt in Forsythe v. R. (1980), 53 C.C.C. (2d) 225 (S.C.C.).
3R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [hereinafter Criminal Code].
4For comments see C. Boyle & M. MacCrimmon, “R. v. Seaboyer. A Lost Cause?” (1992) 7 C.R. (4th) 
225 and A. Allman, “A Reply to ‘R. v. Seaboyer. A  Lost Cause?’ ” (1992) 10 C.R. (4th) 153.
5Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
[hereinafter Charter].
The Canadian cases cited above all pertain to [similar fact] evidence tendered by 
the Crown against the accused. The question arises whether the same power to 
exclude exists with respect to defence evidence. Canadian courts, like courts in 
most common law jurisdictions, have been extremely cautious in restricting the 
power of the accused to call evidence in his or her defence, a reluctance founded 
in the fundamental tenet of our judicial system that an innocent person must not 
be convicted. It follows from this that the prejudice must substantially outweigh 
the value of the evidence before a judge can exclude evidence relevant to a 
defence allowed by law.6
In addition to insisting on judicial discretion for constitutional validity, the 
majority insisted that the courts would have to be more reluctant to exclude 
evidence of the victim’s sexual activity on other occasions when tendered by the 
defence, than they would be with respect to evidence of the accused’s sexual 
activity when tendered by the Crown. After striking down the legislation, the 
Court recognized that the existing common law was not up to the task of 
protecting the interests of the complainant and the Court “legislated” new and 
more extensive protection than had ever before existed.7
The new legislation, s. 276(1) of the Criminal Code, following the guidelines 
set out in Seaboyer, provides that evidence that the complainant has engaged in 
sexual activity, whether with the accused or with any other person, is not 
admissible to support an inference that the complainant is more likely to have 
consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge, or that 
she is less worthy of belief. For evidence of prior sexual conduct to be admitted, 
it must be relevant to some other issue. The legislation then goes on to provide 
an elaborate procedure for the admission of such evidence when it is relevant to 
these other issues, and requires that the trial judge state reasons describing the 
manner in which the evidence was determined to be relevant. The trial judge is 
specifically directed to instruct the jury as to the uses that they can make of that 
evidence. The jury must be told that the evidence can be used only in determining 
these other issues and cannot be used to support an inference that the victim 
consented on this occasion.
What are these other issues to which this type of evidence might be relevant? 
In prosecutions for sexual assault there may be cases of mistaken identity and 
there may be cases where the accused defends on the ground that he was mistaken 
in his belief on the matter of consent. In those cases the evidence might be 
received. But what of trials of sexual assault where the accused and the 
complainant testify differently as to whether or not there was, in fact, consent? 
In those cases, which may be more common, the legislation provides that evidence
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of sexual activity on other occasions cannot be admitted to prove consent. Thus, 
evidence of the complainant’s sexual activity is rigidly foreclosed.
The common law had always recognized that previous sexual conduct with the 
accused was relevant to the issue of whether the complainant consented on the 
occasion under review. Professor H.R. Galvin’s article, “Shielding Rape Victims 
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade,”8 quoted 
heavily in Seaboyer, proposed a rape shield law, but confined the same to the 
exclusion of evidence of sexual conduct with persons other than the accused. 
Professor Galvin wrote:
Even the most ardent reformers acknowledged the high probative value of past 
sexual conduct in at least two instances. The first is when the defendant claims 
consent and establishes prior consensual relations between himself and the 
complainant. ... although the evidence is offered to prove consent, its probative 
value rests on the nature of the complainant’s specific mindset toward the accused 
rather than on her general unchaste character. ... All twenty-five statutes adopting 
the Michigan approach [to rape shield laws] allow the accused to introduce 
evidence of prior sexual conduct between himself and the complainant. The high 
probative value and minimal prejudicial effect of this evidence have been 
discussed.9
Another article quoted by the majority in Seaboyer is Professor Vivian Berger’s 
“Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom.”10 Professor 
Berger justified the reception of evidence of sexual conduct with the accused in 
this way:
The inference from past to present behaviour does not, as in cases of third party 
acts, rest on highly dubious beliefs about “women who do” and “women who 
don’t” but rather relies on common sense and practical psychology. Admission of 
the proof “supplies the accused with a circumstance making it probable that he did 
not obtain by violence what he might have secured by persuasion.”11
Suppose A and B have been living together for a year. The evidence is clear 
and undisputed that the parties regularly engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. 
On the evening brought into question before the court, sexual intercourse 
occurred. A says it was consensual and B says it was not. Consent is the sole 
issue. The new legislation states that evidence of the previous consensual activity 
is inadmissible. No one, of course, would suggest that such previous conduct 
would be determinative of the issue, but is it not relevant and at least worth 
considering along with the other evidence? The commonly accepted meaning of
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relevance bespeaks a very low threshold: Does the evidence offered render the 
desired inference more probable than the inference would be without the 
evidence?12 To be relevant, evidence does not have to render the proposition for 
which it is tendered more probable than not. By relevance we mean, solely, that 
the evidence has some legitimate influence on reason. If we decide that evidence 
of sexual activity with the accused on other occasions is relevant, the trial judge 
would normally have the discretion to next decide whether the probative worth was 
outweighed by the possibility of prejudice. If she decided that the probative worth 
outweighed the possibility of prejudice she would, normally, receive the evidence. 
The new legislation, however, provides for no discretion in this regard. Because 
of the absolute, rigid nature of the prohibition, which operates regardless of 
whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential prejudice to 
the trial’s outcome, the legislation must be unconstitutional for the same reasons 
given by the Court in Seaboyer. Applying the test there announced, the new s. 276, 
just like the old, must violate s. 7 of the Charter. There is no discretion in the trial 
judge to receive the evidence when the probative value outweighs the prejudice.
Professor Galvin’s proposal stated that the trial judge could receive:
Evidence of a pattern of sexual conduct so distinctive and so closely resembling the
accused’s version of the alleged encounter with the victim as to tend to prove that
the victim consented to the act charged ... .13
The majority in Seaboyer wrote that “similar fact evidence ... cannot be used 
illegitimately merely to show that the complainant consented,”14 and where 
evidence of sexual conduct on other occasions was admitted the trial judge should 
warn the jury against this prohibited use. The new legislation, although not using 
the language of similar fact, by its absolute prohibition against any evidence being 
admitted to prove consent, similarly would foreclose such evidence no matter how 
strikingly similar. Why? Are we to take it as a given that previous sexual conduct 
of the complainant can never be indicative of a propensity, a disposition, a 
willingness, to have sexual intercourse, from which a trier could infer that she 
acted in conformity with the same?
The author of the majority opinion in Seaboyer also wrote, just the year before, 
the majority opinion in R. v. B.(C.R.).15 That case is the most fully reasoned 
Supreme Court of Canada opinion on the issue of similar fact evidence ever 
delivered. The issue there, in a sexual assault case, was the admissibility of similar
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fact evidence when tendered by the Crown. The majority opinion reads:
It is no longer necessary to hang the [similar fact] evidence tendered on the peg 
of some issue other than disposition. ... the preponderant view prevailing in 
Canada is ... [that] evidence of propensity, while generally inadmissible, may 
exceptionally be admitted where the probative value of the evidence in relation to 
an issue in question is so high that it displaces the heavy prejudice which will 
inevitably inure to the accused where evidence of prior immoral or illegal acts is 
presented to the juiy.16
Why is it that evidence of previous conduct of the accused can be received to show 
his disposition, his propensity, in a sexual assault case, and the trier is permitted 
to infer therefrom that he acted in conformity with that disposition on the occasion 
under review, but it is forbidden to similarly treat such evidence concerning the 
complainant? Where the accused defends on the basis that there was no sexual 
assault because the complainant consented, Seaboyer, and the new legislation, says 
that the complainant’s similar acts cannot be used to show consent and such 
evidence is then completely foreclosed.
Suppose the evidence is that the accused and complainant met in Sam’s Bar 
one Saturday night and left to go to her apartment. It is agreed that sexual 
intercourse occurred, but the parties disagree on the issue of consent. Consent is 
the sole issue. The accused testifies that he was sitting at the bar when the 
complainant approached him, offered him a drink and propositioned him. The 
accused wants to call the owner of the bar to testify that each Saturday night for 
the previous 4 weeks the complainant came into his bar, offered a stranger a 
drink, propositioned him and left in his company. This similar fact evidence is 
evidence relevant to the issue of consent, but according to Seaboyer, and the new 
legislation, the evidence would not be receivable. There is no ability in the trial 
judge, in dealing with this situation, to exercise discretion, to assess probative 
worth on the issue of consent and weigh the same against potential prejudice. By 
the test for constitutional validity announced in Seaboyer, the law would necessarily 
contravene s. 7.
On the issue of receiving similar fact evidence tendered by the accused, 
Professor Berger writes:
What if the accused were offering to show that the victim habitually goes to bars 
on Saturday nights, picks up strangers and takes them home to bed with her, and 
that over the past twelve months she has done so on more than twenty occasions.
Now could one assert with assurance that this particular sexual record does not 
substantially reinforce the defendant’s version of the night’s events? And if it 
does, should he not be permitted as a matter of constitutional right to place this
evidence before the jury?17
R. v. Scopelliti18 dealt with a trial for murder. Justice Martin, writing for the 
Court, decided that previous violent acts of the victim, unknown to the accused at 
the time of the incident, could be received to support an inference that the 
deceased had a propensity for violence of a kind likely to result in conduct that 
might have caused the accused to consider it was life threatening. Previous similar 
acts of the victim were received to show a disposition for violence in the victim 
and the jury was invited to infer that the victim acted in conformity with that 
disposition on the occasion under review. There the accused was charged with 
murder. Are the evidence rules different depending on the nature of the charge? 
Why? In B.(C.R.), Justice Sopinka wrote that “there is no special rule with 
relation to similar fact evidence in sexual offences.”19 There, he was dealing with 
the admissibility of similar fact evidence introduced by the Crown. Should that 
same sentiment be applicable here, to similar fact evidence tendered by the 
defence?
This short note suggests serious defects in the new legislation. The attempt 
at reform was obviously well intended. The legislature, however, has not drawn 
the appropriate line to ensure a fair trial and at the same time protect the 
legitimate interests of both the complainant and the accused. Sometimes 
legislation cannot do the job. Education of all the individuals in the system, 
eliminating the myths and stereotypical thinking in this area, is absolutely 
necessary if we are to accomplish true reform.
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